Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
In the social welfare literature on infinite utility streams, there is a long tradition of combining two basic desiderata: the Strong Pareto SP axiom requires social preferences to reflect Pareto improvements and Finite Anonymity FA ensures equal treatment of generations by imposing invariance to transformations that swap the utility levels of two (or, by transitivity, finitely many) generations; precise definitions are in Section 3. We study intuitive infinite-horizon generalizations of classical utilitarianism for finitely many generations in combination with these two minimal requirements of equity and efficiency. The well-known results of Basu and Mitra [3] , Zame [21] and Lauwers [12] tell us that no complete ordering satisfying the two requirements can be represented by a social welfare function or otherwise be described explicitly. This is an inconvenient state of affairs for policy analysis and, more generally, for transparent decision making, as one would like to have explicit criteria for evaluating streams of utility. Nevertheless, their results imply that some streams will inevitably be noncomparable.
Faced with these restrictions, we study incomplete social preferences that satisfy intuitive generalizations of finite utilitarianism to an infinite horizon setting. For a finite number n of generations, classical utilitarianism (see Moulin [15, p. 21] for a textbook treatment) declares utility profile u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) to be weakly preferred to v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), written u v, if and only if
For a countably infinite number of future generations, while the explicit construction of complete preferences is constrained by the theorems of Lauwers [12] and Zame [21] , an obvious extension of (1) would require
or, more generally,
u v for streams u, v whose difference u − v is summable and satisfies
Banerjee [1, p. 329 ], for instance, explicitly expresses the desirability of (2). Our aim is to characterize when a social welfare relation (SWR; a reflexive, transitive binary relation) or an ethical SWR (a SWR satisfying SP and FA) satisfies (2) or (3) . Besides a standard axiom on interpersonal comparison of utilities, we introduce two new axioms. The first axiom, Horizon Consistency HC, expresses a consistency between large, finite-horizon problems and the infinite-horizon problem, much in the spirit of the consistency requirement in Brock's [5] classical characterization of von Weizsäcker's [19] overtaking criterion. The second axiom is a mild continuity requirement.
Our main results are summarized as follows: Theorems 1 to 4 all provide characterizations of relations satisfying (2) or (3) on two domains that appear frequently in the literature. Logical independence of the axioms is discussed in section 4.2. Our characterizations of SWRs satisfying (2) and (3) answer an open question from Banerjee [1, p. 335 ] whether such relations "can be characterized without postulating any form of continuity": our results show that a certain continuity condition (in our notation, εC(U fin )) is indeed necessary for utilitarian requirements (2) and (3). Finally, Theorem 5 shows that imposing some of our axioms on streams with welldefined, finite averages gives sufficient conditions for SWRs to discriminate among streams with distinct averages and Theorem 6 provides a new characterization of the utilitarian SWR of Basu and Mitra [4] ; the latter is done on a larger domain and under a weaker assumption concerning interpersonal comparison of utilities.
To our knowledge, a careful examination of necessary and sufficient conditions for utilitarian condition (2) on streams that are summable or (3) on streams with a summable difference has not been conducted before. There are several characterizations of utilitarianism in finite-horizon problems, including Milnor [14] , Maskin [13] , and d'Aspremont and Gevers [7] . 1 Basu and Mitra adapt the latter to infinite utility streams to characterize a utilitarian social welfare relation (defined in (5) below) that leads to rankings that are easily accepted, but only allows comparison of utility streams where one dominates the other beyond some finite horizon: their utilitarian SWR does not satisfy the intuitive generalizations of utilitarianism in (2) and (3). 2 They ask the general question which additional continuity properties can be motivated by ethical principles in this context (cf. [4, p. 357]). As indicated above, Banerjee [1] explicitly raises the particular issue that we discuss. His focus, however, is on extending the utilitarian SWR of [4] and the Suppes-Sen grading principle ( [17] , [16] ) to allow for extended anonymity conditions using classes of infinite permutations. He does not address the characterization of SWRs satisfying (2) or (3). is the set of (bounded) utility streams u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . .), where u n represents the welfare level of generation n ∈ N. Our axioms are sometimes indexed by subsets V of U . The three most important instances of subsets V are the set of streams that are eventually zero, summable, and have well-defined (necessarily finite) averages, 1 Less directly related are papers in utility theory by Wakker [20] , who restricts attention to streams that are eventually equal to a given constant, and Fishburn and Edwards [8] , who only compare streams that differ in finitely many coordinates. 2 Tapan Mitra (private communication) mentioned that they were aware of this shortcoming of their utilitarian SWR; in a short uncirculated note of February 2004, he had proposed another relation: for all streams u, v, 
Notation
(a) if u − v is summable, u v iff ∞ i=1 (u i − v i ) ≥ 0; (b) if u − v is not summable, u v iff there is an n ∈ N with n i=1 u i ≥ n i=1 v i and u i ≥ v i for all i > n.
respectively:
U 0 = {u ∈ U : u n = 0 for all but finitely many n ∈ N},
Given u, v ∈ U , we write u ≥ v and say that u dominates v if u n ≥ v n for all n.
For j ∈ N, e j is the stream with j-th coordinate equal to one and all others equal to zero. For n ∈ N, c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ R n , a ∈ R and u ∈ U , we sometimes write a n = ( n times a, . . . , a), a = (a, a, . . .), au = (au 1 , au 2 , . . .),
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on U ; u v means that u is considered at least as good as v by society, u ∼ v means that u v and v u, u v means that u v holds but v u does not. We call
If extends , we call weaker than .
Axioms
An ethical (some authors use the term equitable) SWR, or ESWR for short, is a social welfare relation that satisfies the Strong Pareto and Finite anonymity axioms: (1) is characterized by SP, FA, and a further assumption on interpersonal comparability of utility; see, for example, d'Aspremont and Gevers [7] . We state two versions of interpersonal comparability for the infinite horizon context:
is defined in terms of the difference u − v of the streams which are to be compared, then u − v = (u + α) − (v + α) for all α ∈ U . So if satisfies FC, then it also satisfies UC. This is the case with, for instance, Basu and Mitra's [4] utilitarian criterion, Gale's [9] formulations of von Weizsäcker's [19] overtaking criterion and the catching-up criterion, and Jonsson and Voorneveld's [10] limitdiscounted utilitarian criterion; for definitions, see (5), (6), (10) , and (11) below.
The following axioms will be used in the main characterization:
Epsilon-continuity appears to be original to our approach. Using perturbations of the first (or, in combination with Finite Anonymity, a single) coordinate only, it is an extremely weak continuity requirement. For instance, u + (ε, 0) converges to u as ε goes to zero in all but one of the standard topologies on U in [11, Sec. 3] and [2, Sec. 2.3; their properties M.1 and M.4 of a metric suffice for this conclusion]; the only exception is the topology of Campbell [6] generated by metric d(u, v) = sup{δ(u n , v n )/n : n ∈ N}, with δ(u n , v n ) = 0 if u n = v n and δ(u n , v n ) = 1 otherwise. So it is implied by upper semicontinuity (closed upper contour sets U (v) = {u ∈ U : u v} for each v) in all these topologies. 3 Horizon Consistency captures the intuition formulated in Brock [5, p. 929 ] that "decisions on infinite programs are consistent with decisions on finite programs of length n if n is large enough". However, HC is a weaker variant of Brock's third axiom (and of the related "weak consistency" axiom in [4, p. 359] ), which requires that u v holds if u [n] v [n] for large n. This stronger form of HC does not allow us to order summable streams by their sums. Indeed, it is not hard to verify that if SWR satisfies the stronger form of HC and
then must rank u = (1, 0, 0, 0, . . .) above v = (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, . . .). Horizon Consistency on the other hand is compatible with (2) and (3); the restriction of HC to U fin is a necessary condition (Theorems 1, 2, 3).
Each axiom above can be restricted to an arbitrary subset V of U by requiring only that the condition in question hold when u and v are both in V . The axioms thus obtained are denoted SP(V ), FA(V ), UC(V ), FC(V ), HC(V ) and εC(V ). When V = U , the index set will be omitted.
We say that a SWR on U orders streams with finite sums by their sums if
For ethical SWRs, Theorem 1 shows that FC(U 0 ), HC(U fin ) and εC(U fin ) are necessary and sufficient conditions for (4), so it may be worthwhile discussing them in relation to two ESWRs that do not satisfy (4) . We denote the utilitarian SWR of Basu and Mitra [4] and von Weizsäcker's overtaking criterion as formalized in 6 ADAM JONSSON AND MARK VOORNEVELD Svensson [18] and Gale [9] by U and W , respectively:
To see that U violates HC(U fin ), take u = (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, . . . ) and v = (1, 0, 0, . . . ).
Then v [n] U u [n] for every n, but there is no N ∈ N with We start with a lemma for the set U 0 . Proof. (a): We first prove that for all j ∈ N, a ∈ R :
If j = 1, this follows from reflexivity of . So let j > 1. By FA(U 0 ),
By FC(U 0 ) with α = 1 2 ae 1 − 1 2 ae j , this gives (7) . For u ∈ U 0 , let m(u) = min{n ∈ N : u k = 0 for all k > n}. If m(u) = 1, u = (σ(u), 0), so u ∼ (σ(u), 0) by reflexivity of . If m(u) = n > 1, (7) gives u n e 1 − u n e n ∼ 0, so by FC(U 0 ), adding u to both sides gives
The left stream has at most n − 1 nonzero coordinates. Repeating with u n−1 e 1 − u n−1 e n−1 ∼ 0, . . . , u 2 e 1 − u 2 e 2 ∼ 0, each time changing a (possibly) nonzero coordinate to zero and adding it to coordinate 1, we find that u ∼ (σ(u), 0). 
This leaves us properly equipped for the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. First, let ESWR satisfy (4) . It clearly satisfies FC on U 0 . For εC on U fin , let u, v ∈ U fin have u + (ε, 0) v for every ε > 0. By (4) , this is equivalent with
n=1 v i and, by (4) , that u v. For HC on U fin , let u, v ∈ U fin and N ∈ N be such that u [n] v [n] for all n ≥ N . By (4) , this means that
Conversely, let ESWR satisfy the axioms. As U 0 ⊂ U fin , Lemma 1 applies.
Equivalently: for all n ≥ N , the streams u [n] + (ε/2, 0) and v [n] satisfy 
if and only if it satisfies FA(U 0 ), SP(U fin ), HC(U fin ), εC(U fin ) and the following extension of the Finite Unit Comparability axiom:
Proof. That a SWR satisfying (8) also satisfies the axioms is shown analogously as before; in the interest of brevity, we omit it. Conversely, let SWR satisfy the axioms. Let u, v ∈ U have u − v ∈ U fin . Applying the extended unit comparability property Table 1 . SWRs and the axioms they do (+) or do not (−) satisfy. (2) and (3) are the catching-up criterion of Gale [9, p. 3] :
5) and consequently do satisfy the intuitive utilitarian requirements
and the limit-discounted utilitarian criterion of Jonsson and Voorneveld [10] :
4.2. Logical independence. The axioms in each of the preceding theorems 1, 2, and 3 are logically independent. We show this for the five axioms FA(U 0 ), FC(U 0 ), SP(U fin ), HC(U fin ), and εC(U fin ) in Theorem 2 by providing five SWRs, each violating exactly one of those axioms. The same relations can be used to establish logical independence in the other theorems. Verifying that a SWR satisfies the given properties is routine work (available upon request); we only show explicitly which axiom is violated. Consider the overtaking criterion W defined in (6) and the four SWRs defined as follows:
u 2 v for all u, v (i.e., under 2 , all streams are equivalent),
The lower limits are defined in R∪{−∞, +∞}. Properties are summarized in Table  1 . We discussed those of W after (6). 1 violates HC(U fin ): take u = (1/2, 0, 1/4, 0, 1/8, 0, 1/16, 0, . . .) obtained by taking powers of 1/2 followed by a zero. Similarly, take v = (0, 1/4, 0, 1/8, 0, 1/16, . . .). Then u [n] 1 v [n] for all n, but u and v are not 1 -comparable. 
Remark 1. For each of the five SWRs, when an axiom is satisfied, it is satisfied on U . (An axiom that fails on a subset automatically fails on the full domain.) So these SWRs also show that FA, FC, SP, HC, and εC are logically independent.
4.3.
The domain [0, 1] N . Some papers take the domain of utility streams to be the set [0, 1] N of sequences in [0, 1]. We stated the results above on the larger set U of bounded streams. Firstly, this is less restrictive. Secondly, this set is closed under addition and scalar multiplication, which makes many of our axioms easy to state; on [0, 1] N , one often needs the caveat that all manipulated streams belong to that domain as well. For instance, the appropriate modifications of Epsilon-Continuity and Finite Unit Comparability on subsets of [0, 1] N are as follows:
Finite Proof. (a): This follows from Lemma 1(i) of [4] , which states that u ∼ v for all u, v ∈ [0, 1] N with at most finitely many elements distinct from zero. They use a slightly different unit comparability axiom for streams u, v with u n = v n for all large n (see (13) below), where we more specifically assume that u n = v n = 0 for all large n. But all streams in their proof of Lemma 1(i) are eventually zero, so the distinction doesn't matter for our purposes. Let u, v ∈ [0, 1] N be summable with u v. To show:
By restricting the SWRs in section 4.2 to [0, 1] N , we find that the properties in Theorem 4 are logically independent. 4.4. Distinct averages. Imposing some of our axioms on the set U av of streams with well-defined, finite averages allows us to discriminate among streams with distinct averages. Observe that our continuity requirement εC is not required here. With minor changes in the axioms, requiring HC on pairs of streams u, v with u−v ∈ U av and SP on U , the theorem can be extended to streams whose difference belongs to U av . Theorem 6 provides a variant of their characterization in two respects: (1) we consider the less restrictive domain U instead of [0, 1] N ; (2) our unit comparability axiom does not impose restrictions on all streams u, v that are eventually identical, but only on streams that are eventually zero. That is, we require only:
A characterization of the utilitarian SWR
which is precisely Unit Comparability on U 0 . A by-product of Theorem 6 is the equivalence of the Partial unit comparability axiom and UC(U 0 ) for ethical SWRs. The corresponding result for SWRs on [0, 1] N is proved under the aforementioned modifications of the axioms.
